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 
Abstract—In this paper, a new methodology for stability 
assessment of a smart power system is proposed. The key to this 
assessment is an index called betweenness index which is based 
on ideas from complex network theory. The proposed 
betweenness index is an improvement of previous works since it 
considers the actual real power flow through the transmission 
lines along the network. Furthermore, this work initiates a new 
area for complex system research to assess the stability of the 
power system.   
 
Index Terms--Transient stability, complex network, smart 
grid, bus admittance matrix. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ANY of the public infrastructures like electric power 
network are subject to two types of threats: intentional 
and accidental [1]. Intentional attack can be subdivided into 
physical or cyber attacks. According to US government 
accountability office, in 2002, 70 percent of power companies 
experienced some kind of severe cyber attack to their 
computing or energy management systems [2]. Physical 
attacks against key elements of the system are also common. 
Whether it is going to be a physical or cyber attack, the 
modern smart grid must resist. The designers of the modern 
grid should plan for a dedicated, well planned attack 
prevention strategy. For the modern grid to resist attack it 
must reduce the vulnerability of the grid to attack by 
protecting key assets from cyber, physical, or accidental 
attacks. The complex networks approach to electric power 
network security would identify key vulnerabilities, assess the 
likelihood of threats, and determine the consequences of 
attacks. One of the particular goals of the security program is 
to identify critical sites and systems.  
Complex networks, which had been the main research area 
of graph theory, have drawn interest of researchers from 
various disciplines as graph theory began to focus on statistics 
and analytics [3]. A complex network was proposed as a 
random network [4]. There are other networks whose 
behaviour falls in between regular and random, and these are 
classified as small-world networks [5]–[7]. A power system 
usually falls in the small–world network category [8]. 
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Complex network theory has been used to model the power 
system and analyze its several aspects [8]–[13]. The structural 
vulnerability of the North American power grid was studied 
after the August 2003 blackout affecting the United States 
[14]. Similarly, the large scale blackouts and cascading 
failures motivated analysis of the Italian power grid based on 
the model for cascading failures [13], [15]. How redistribution 
of load on nodes due to failure of certain important nodes can 
cause a cascading failure was also demonstrated [16], [17]. 
Vulnerability analysis models [6]–[11] were initially 
proposed for complex abstract networks and were then used in 
power systems [1], [7]–[15]. However, those physicists’ work 
neglected some concrete engineering features. Therefore, there 
are good prospects for researchers to further investigate the 
complex problems by considering power system 
characteristics and complex network theory together. Electric 
power networks are different from these abstract networks. 
Electric networks are governed by Ohm’s and Kirchhoff’s 
Laws which are used to form the bus admittance matrix. These 
special characteristics result in a unique pattern of interaction 
between nodes in power grids. Therefore, for better explaining 
complex blackouts of power systems, an improved model 
which is based on the system bus admittance matrix is 
proposed, representing the special electrical topological 
structure [18]. 
Till now power system research based on complex network 
theory has been mainly on fault study or vulnerability studies. 
Since the nodes and edges of the power grid increase almost 
every time, and the interaction of the components in power 
system becomes more and more complex, attention must be 
paid in new research approaches to solve load flow, fault 
analysis, and stability analysis problems [3]. Since smart grid 
adds new dimension and complexity in the power system. In 
this paper we have proposed a method for addressing transient 
stability issue in smart power system based on topographical 
information of power grid.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes a model for analyzing power system within the 
context of complex networks.  Section III describes some 
statistic parameter for complex network. Section IV gives an 
index for assessing the stability of complex power system 
network using complex network framework. Some concluding 
remarks are given in Section V. 
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II.  POWER SYSTEM AS A COMPLEX NETWORK 
To analyze the power system within the context of complex 
network theory, the first step is to model the system as a graph 
[18]. From the perspective of network theory, a graph is an 
abstract representation of a set of objects, called nodes or 
vertices, where some pairs of the objects are connected via 
links or edges. The power system of today is a complex 
interconnected network which can be subdivided into four 
major parts of generation, transmission, distribution and loads 
[19]. To portray the assemblage of various components of 
power system, engineers use single-line or one-line diagram 
which provides significant information about the system in a 
concise form [20]. Power is supplied form the generator nodes 
to the load nodes via transmission and/or distribution lines. 
Since for a given operating condition, power flows only in one 
direction, a directed graph can be easily constructed from the 
single-line representation of the power system considering 
various generators, bus bars, substations, or loads of the 
system as nodes or vertices and transmission lines and 
transformers as edges or links between various nodes of the 
system.  The principle of mapping is described as follows: 
 
a) all impedances between any bus and neutral are 
neglected, 
b) all transmission and/or distribution lines are modeled 
except for the local lines in the plants and substations, 
c) all transmission lines and transformers are modeled as 
weighted lines, the weight is equal to the admittance between 
the buses, and 
d) parallel lines between buses are modeled as an equivalent 
single line. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  The IEEE-30 bus system. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Physical topology graph of IEEE-30 bus system. 
 
To illustrate mapping of a single-line diagram to a directed 
graph, a simple example of IEEE 30 bus system [21] is used 
here. Fig. 1 depicts the IEEE 30 bus system with 30 bus bars, 
and 41 links connecting them. Fig. 2 is the corresponding 
mapped graph from the original IEEE 30 bus system. It 
contains 30 nodes/vertices which correspond to the slack, 
voltage-controlled, and load bus bars of the original system. 
The transmission lines are represented by the 41 links/edges 
which connects various nodes. Now, the weight matrix from 
the graph has to be formulated. The traditional modeling 
approach only considers the physical connection [3],         
[22]–[26], the weight matrix, W, (also called adjacency matrix 
or Boolean matrix) is calculated by considering only the 
physical topology of the graph. If there is a connection 
between node i and node j then the corresponding element of 
the weight matrix wij = 1, otherwise wij = 0. The weight 
matrix found in traditional model has no sense of 
directionality, i.e., when nodes i and j are connected wij = wji = 
1. This model does not capture the electrical power system’s 
most important trait like impedance which plays a significant 
role in the flow of power, losses, stability of the system. 
Several researchers have considered the reactance of the line 
[9], [27], neglecting the line resistance which is very small for 
transmission systems. But, in order to generalize the model for 
both the transmission and the distribution system, the 
impedance, (i.e., both the reactance and resistance) needs to be 
taken into consideration. This approach based on bus 
admittance matrix is well adopted by various researches in the 
power system [18], [28]. In this case, the weight matrix can be 
found from the off-diagonal elements of the bus admittance 
matrix. For an n bus system the node-voltage equation is 
written in the matrix form as: 
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or 
(2)                                                    busbusbus VYI   
where, Ybus  is the bus admittance matrix. The diagonal 
elements of the bus admittance matrix correspond to the sum 
of the impedances of the lines connected to each bus of the 
system. Since diagonal elements are not included in weight 
matrix, in effect, the role of various impedances connected 
from the bus to the neutral is not considered here. The off-
diagonal elements are equal to the negative of the equivalent 
admittance between the nodes. They are known as the mutual 
or transfer admittances. So, in this case the ij–th element of the 
weight matrix can be found from wij = Yij. Here, it is obvious 
that Ybus is a symmetric matrix, i.e., Yij = Yji. So, the 
directionality of the power flow is not considered in this 
model. The information of the direction of power flow within 
a network can be found from load flow analysis. By 
conducting power flow we can find the voltage magnitudes 
and angles of all the buses within the system.  If there is a link 
between bus i and bus j, if voltage angle of bus i is higher than 
that of bus j, then power flows from bus i to bus j, otherwise 
power flows in the reverse direction, i.e., from bus j to bus i. 
The weight matrix is constructed using the following rule: 
 
(3)                                         
 0 if    ,
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ij
ijij
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w  
where, Pij indicates the flow of power from node i to node j.  
Fig. 3 shows the directionality of the IEEE 30 bus system in 
steady-state. Table I summarizes the elements of the weight 
matrix for IEEE 30 bus system. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Power flow diagram of IEEE 30 bus system. 
 
 
TABLE I 
ELEMENTS OF WEIGHT MATRIX FOR IEEE 30 BUS SYSTEM 
 
Element Weight  Element Weight 
w1-2 0.0192 + 0.0575i w12-15 0.0662 + 0.1304i 
w1-3 0.0452 + 0.1852i w12-16 0.0945 + 0.1987i 
w2-4 0.0570 + 0.1737i w13-12 0.0000 + 0.1400i 
w2-5 0.0472 + 0.1983i w14-15 0.2210 + 0.1997i 
w2-6 0.0581 + 0.1763i w15-18 0.1073 + 0.2185i 
w3-4 0.0132 + 0.0379i w15-23 0.1000 + 0.2020i 
w4-6 0.0119 + 0.0414i w16-17 0.0824 + 0.1923i 
w4-12 0.0000 + 0.2560i w18-19 0.0639 + 0.1292i 
w6-7 0.0267 + 0.0820i w20-19 0.0340 + 0.0680i 
w6-8 0.0120 + 0.0420i w22-21 0.0116 + 0.0236i 
w6-9 0.0000 + 0.2080i w22-24 0.1150 + 0.1790i 
w6-10 0.0000 + 0.5560i w23-24 0.1320 + 0.2700i 
w6-28 0.0169 + 0.0599i w25-24 0.1885 + 0.3292i 
w7-5 0.0460 + 0.1160i w25-26 0.2544 + 0.3800i 
w9-11 0.0000 + 0.2080i w27-25 0.1093 + 0.2087i 
w9-10 0.0000 + 0.1100i w27-29 0.2198 + 0.4153i 
w10-20 0.0936 + 0.2090i w27-30 0.3202 + 0.6027i 
w10-17 0.0324 + 0.0845i w28-27 0.0000 + 0.3960i 
w10-21 0.0348 + 0.0749i w27-8 0.0636 + 0.2000i 
w10-22 0.0727 + 0.1499i w29-30 0.2399 + 0.4533i 
w12-14 0.1231 + 0.2559i other ∞ 
 
III.  TOPOLOGICAL STATISTIC PARAMETER IN POWER GRID 
This section describes some basic statistic parameter of 
power grid within complex network framework. All of these 
parameters come from graph theory, the branch of 
mathematics that deals with networks [29].  
A.  Degree 
The number of links, directed or undirected, connected with 
a node i in a graph is called the degree of the node, di. For the 
IEEE 30 bus system in Fig. 3 the degree of various nodes are 
given in Table II. When the graph is directed, the out-degree 
of a node is equal to the number of outward-directed links, and 
the in-degree is equal to the number of inward-directed links.  
The in-degree and out-degree of the IEEE 30 bus system is 
given in Table III. The hub of a graph is the node with the 
largest degree. So node 6 with degree 7 is the hub of IEEE 30 
bus system. The degree sequence distribution of nodes of the 
IEEE 30 bus system is shown in Fig. 4. 
 
TABLE II 
DEGREE OF VARIOUS NODES OF IEEE 30 BUS SYSTEM 
 
Node Degree  Node Degree  Node  Degree 
1 2 11 1 21 2 
2 4 12 5 22 3 
3 2 13 1 23 2 
4 4 14 2 24 3 
5 2 15 4 25 3 
6 7 16 2 26 1 
7 2 17 2 27 4 
8 2 18 2 28 3 
9 3 19 2 29 2 
10 6 20 2 30 2 
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TABLE III 
IN-DEGREE AND OUT-DEGREE OF VARIOUS NODES OF IEEE 30 BUS SYSTEM 
 
Node 
 
Degree  Node Degree  Node Degree In Out In Out In Out 
1 0 2 11 1 0 21 2 0 
2 1 3 12 2 3 22 1 2 
3 1 1 13 0 1 23 1 1 
4 2 2 14 1 1 24 3 0 
5 2 0 15 2 2 25 1 2 
6 2 5 16 1 1 26 1 0 
7 1 1 17 2 0 27 1 3 
8 2 0 18 1 1 28 1 2 
9 1 2 19 2 0 29 1 1 
10 2 4 20 1 1 30 2 0 
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Fig. 4.  Degree sequence distribution of IEEE 30 bus system. 
B.  Clustering Coefficient 
Every node directly connected with a given node is called 
the neighbor of that node. If there are di such neighbors of a 
node i, it means that there may be [di(di-1)]/2 potential links 
among the neighbors of the node i. Suppose that the neighbors 
share c links; then the clustering coefficient of node i, Cc(i), is 
the ratio between actual number of links and maximum 
possible links.  
 
(4)                                        
)1(
2)(  ii dd
ciCc  
The clustering coefficient of an entire graph is the average 
over all node clustering coefficients. If there are n nodes in the 
whole system the clustering coefficient of the whole system or 
graph G, CC(G), is 
 
(5)                                    1)(
1
(i)  Cc
N
GCC
N
i


  
The clustering coefficient of IEEE 30 bus system is 0.2348. 
C.  Characteristic Path Length 
The length of a path is equal to the number of links between 
starting and ending nodes of the path. Path length is measured 
in hops—the number of links along the path. The distance 
between two nodes along a path is equal to the number of hops 
that separate them. It is possible for a graph to contain 
multiple paths connecting nodes. Generally, the shortest path 
is used to calculate the distance between nodes i and j. This is 
also known as the direct path between two nodes. The average 
path length of a graph is equal to the average over all direct 
paths. This metric is also known as the characteristic path 
length of the graph. The diameter of the graph is the maximum 
distance between any pairs of nodes [3]. The characteristic 
path length and diameter of the IEEE 30 bus system is 3.43 
and 7 hops respectively. 
Table IV summarizes various statistic parameters of several 
IEEE test systems.  
 
TABLE IV 
STATISTICAL PARAMETERS OF STANDARD IEEE TEST SYSTEMS 
 
Parameters 30 Bus  57 Bus 118 Bus 300 Bus 
Node 30 57 118 300 
Edge 41 80 186 411 
Average Degree of Node 2.73 2.81 3.15 2.74 
Clustering Coefficient 0.2348 0.1211 0.1592 0.0851 
Characteristic Path Length 3.43 5.12 2.95 5.95 
Diameter 7 13 9 17 
Number of Maximum Shortest Path 3 4 3 1 
IV.  STABILITY ASSESSMENT OF SMART POWER SYSTEM  
A small power system that includes self-contained 
generation, transmission, distribution, sensors, energy storage, 
and energy management software is called a micro smart grid 
[30]. This micro grid has a seamless and synchronized 
connection to a utility power system but can operate 
independently as an island from that system. Interconnections 
are required within several micro smart grids or between 
today’s regional grid layouts and planned renewable energy 
generators to form future mega grids [30] to transmit 
electricity to any region where needed. The vision of the grid 
is to also eliminate congestion problems and balance loads 
from intermittent energy sources across regions. It is also 
known as super grid or national grid.  
When multiple micro smart grids will be interconnected, 
they could have a substantial influence on grid stability. 
Undesirable dynamic interactions could cause key, heavily 
loaded transmission lines to trip, interrupting power exports 
and imports between areas. However, if micro grids are 
designed with their dynamic impact on the transmission 
system taken into account, i.e., analyzing transient stability 
beforehand, they can enhance the stability of the transmission 
lines, which could permit transmission power limits to 
increase. The transient stability of the system depends on the 
transfer reactance which is heavily reliant on the topological 
structure of the power networks. Hence some of the complex 
network concepts and techniques may be applicable to help 
analyze the stability of smart grid systems. Ideas from the 
complex network theory have been used in this paper to find 
whether a smart power system will be stable or not when 
subjected to transmission line removal from the system due to 
fault or overloading. 
Research is ongoing on power system vulnerability analysis 
using complex network theory. There are some critical links in 
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every network which can make the system very vulnerable to 
attacks. The complex network theory has been used to explain 
some phenomenon like cascading effects in a power system 
and identification of vulnerable line. In this paper we address 
the stability or synchronization issue which is immediate 
consequence of random or intentional attack on a network by 
introducing a new vulnerability index called line betweenness 
which relates to the system stability. Betweenness measures 
the extent to which a line or edge lies in the shortest paths 
between various sets of nodes [15]. In order to calculate the 
betweenness we follow the following steps: 
 
(a) Model the power system as a directed graph from the 
power flow solution according the mapping procedure 
described earlier.  
(b) Calculate the weight matrix from the mapped directed 
graph according to (3). 
(c) Form a shortest path set including all possible shortest 
paths from all (source) nodes containing generators to 
all other nodes using Floyd–Warshall algorithm [31]. 
(d) Find the betweenness of every line of the directed 
graph from the shortest path set. If any line is included 
in the shortest path between generator node i and other 
node j then the real power flowing in the line is called 
the betweenness of that line. For the lines that are in 
multiple shortest paths, add up all the betweenness 
indices.   
(e) Sort and rank the lines according to the betweenness in 
descending order.  
 
IEEE 30 bus system is analyzed in this manner to find the 
vulnerability of the system. Table V gives critical lines of the 
system. To test our hypothesis we performed the multimachine 
stability analysis of the system. The system is faulted initially 
and to clear the fault a line is removed from the system at 1 
second and the relative swing of the generators with respect to 
the slack bus is observed to check whether the machines are 
swinging back to the equilibrium position or going out of 
sync. It is found that if the lines with high vulnerability are 
removed the machines cannot maintain synchronism. The 
lower the vulnerability, the higher is the chance for the post-
fault system to be stable.  
Table V also compares two different approach of 
calculating betweenness. In past approach researchers ignored 
the load of the system [27]. It can be seen from the Fig. 1 of 
the IEEE 30 bus system that this system consists of only two 
generators one at bus 1 and other at bus 2. So the impact of 
removing line 1–3 should be higher than removing lines 6–7, 
or 6–8. The past approach gives priority to lines 6–7 or 6–8 
than the line 1–3 in terms of betweenness index. This is 
clearly a shortcoming of the past approach since removing line 
1–3 would leave only one path to flow power from source to 
the rest of the system via bus 1 making the system more 
susceptible to collapse.  The proposed approach improves the 
betweenness of line 1–3 and gives it priority that line 6–7.  
To verify our assumption, we simulated the swing equations 
for this multimachine system and the results are depicted in 
Figs. 5–7. The simulation results are also tabulated in the third 
column of the present and past approach of Table V. Transient 
stability analysis of the network was performed [32]. We can 
remove any line of the interconnections and see the effect on 
the relative swings of the machines. The swing equation is the 
very basic form that we used as given in (6), (7) 
(6)                                             
dt
d
 
)7(                              sin max0 )-P(PH
πf
dt
d
m      
  
TABLE V 
COMPARISON OF BETWEENNESS INDEX  
 
Proposed Approach  Past Approach 
Line Normalized Betweenness Stability Line 
Normalized 
Betweenness Stability 
L1-2 1.0000 Unstable L1-2 1.0000 Unstable 
L1-3 1.0000 Unstable L2-4 1.0000 Unstable 
L2-4 1.0000 Unstable L2-5 1.0000 Unstable 
L2-5 1.0000 Unstable L2-6 1.0000 Unstable 
L2-6 1.0000 Unstable L6-7 1.0000 Stable 
L6-7 0.9621 Stable L6-8 1.0000 Stable 
L6-8 0.9621 Stable L6-9 1.0000 Stable 
L6-9 0.9621 Stable L6-28 1.0000 Stable 
L6-28 0.9621 Stable L1-3 0.9635 Unstable 
L9-10 0.4810 Stable L9-10 0.5000 Stable
L9-11 0.4810 Stable L9-11 0.5000 Stable
L3-4 0.4000 Stable L10-17 0.3889 Stable
L10-17 0.3741 Stable L10-20 0.3889 Stable
L10-20 0.3741 Stable L10-21 0.3889 Stable
L10-21 0.3741 Stable L10-22 0.3889 Stable
L10-22 0.3741 Stable L3-4 0.3854 Stable
L4-12 0.3500 Stable L4-12 0.3372 Stable
L12-14 0.3207 Stable L12-14 0.3333 Stable
L12-15 0.3207 Stable L12-15 0.3333 Stable
L12-16 0.3207 Stable L12-16 0.3333 Stable
L28-27 0.3207 Stable L28-27 0.3333 Stable
L27-25 0.2672 Stable L27-25 0.2778 Stable
L27-29 0.2672 Stable L27-29 0.2778 Stable
L27-30 0.2672 Stable L27-30 0.2778 Stable
L15-18 0.1603 Stable L15-18 0.1667 Stable
L15-23 0.1603 Stable L15-23 0.1667 Stable
L20-19 0.1069 Stable L20-19 0.1111 Stable
L22-24 0.1069 Stable L22-24 0.1111 Stable
L25-26 0.1069 Stable L25-26 0.1111 Stable
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Fig. 5.  Transient stability analysis of the IEEE 30 bus system 
with fault in line 1–2 cleared at 1 sec. Unstable. 
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Fig. 6.  Transient stability analysis of the IEEE 30 bus system 
with fault in line 1–3 cleared at 1 sec. Unstable. 
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Fig. 7.  Transient stability analysis of the IEEE 30 bus system 
with fault in line 6–7 cleared at 1 sec. Stable. 
 
Next, in order to find the sensitivity of the proposed 
betweenness index with topology the generator of bus 1 of 
IEEE 30 bus system is shifted to other buses. This causes 
change in network topology since changing the generator bus 
causes a redistribution of power flow. Hence, critical lines of 
the system change as well. Table VI lists top ten critical lines 
of the IEEE 30 bus system with generation of bus 1 shifted to 
buses 3, and 23 respectively.    
 
TABLE VI 
SENSITIVITY OF BETWEENNESS INDEX FOR IEEE 30 BUS SYSTEM 
 
Generator bus 3  Generator bus 23
Line Normalized Betweenness Stability Line 
Normalized  
Betweenness Stability 
L3-1 1.0000 Unstable L23-15 1.0000 Unstable 
L3-4 1.0000 Unstable L23-24 1.0000 Unstable 
L4-2 1.0000 Unstable L15-12 1.0000 Unstable 
L4-6 1.0000 Unstable L15-14 1.0000 Unstable 
L4-12 1.0000 Unstable L15-18 1.0000 Unstable 
L2-6 0.6786 Stable L12-4 0.7059 Stable 
L6-7 0.6786 Stable L12-13 0.7059 Stable 
L6-8 0.6786 Stable L12-16 0.7059 Stable 
L6-9 0.6786 Stable L24-22 0.7059 Stable 
L6-28 0.6786 Stable L24-25 0.7059 Stable 
 
The simulation is repeated for IEEE 57, 118, and 300 bus 
test system. Tables VII summarizes top fifteen critical lines in 
IEEE 57, 118, and 300 bus systems. From simulation it can be 
concluded that there exists a margin in the proposed 
normalized betweenness index. It can be said that lines with 
normalized betweenness higher than 0.5 is most critical and 
can cause stability problem when subject to fault. So, special 
attention must be given to these critical lines. Again, a line 
whose normalized betweenness index falls below 0.5 requires 
less care and maintenance. The normalized betweenness of 
various IEEE 57 bus test systems is shown in Fig. 8 which 
also a margin of stability.   
 
TABLE VII 
TOP TEN CRITICAL LINES OF VARIOUS STANDARD TEST SYSTEMS 
 
IEEE 57 Bus System 
 
IEEE 118 Bus System 
 
IEEE 300 Bus System 
Line Normalized Betweenness Line 
Normalized 
Betweenness Line 
Normalized 
Betweenness 
L1-2 1.0000 L9-8 1.0000 L2-3 1.0000 
L1-15 1.0000 L10-9 1.0000 L3-1 1.0000 
L1-16 1.0000 L8-5 0.9697 L3-4 1.0000 
L1-17 1.0000 L8-30 0.9697 L3-7 1.0000 
L3-15 1.0000 L89-85 0.8175 L3-129 1.0000 
L15-13 1.0000 L89-88 0.8175 L249-3 1.0000 
L15-14 1.0000 L89-90 0.8175 L4-16 0.9877 
L15-45 1.0000 L89-92 0.8175 L16-15 0.9768 
L14-46 0.5820 L92-91 0.8175 L16-36 0.9768 
L46-47 0.5542 L92-93 0.8175 L33-36 0.9441 
L47-48 0.5265 L92-94 0.8175 L36-28 0.9441 
L48-38 0.4988 L92-102 0.8175 L36-35 0.9441 
L38-22 0.4711 L49-42 0.7676 L36-40 0.9441 
L38-37 0.4711 L49-45 0.7676 L15-31 0.6840 
L9-13 0.3325 L49-47 0.7676 L31-32 0.6840 
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Fig. 8.  Normalized betweenness for IEEE 57 bus system. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we demonstrated the use of complex network 
theory for vulnerability analysis of power systems after ting 
into considerations actual electrical parameters. The 
simulation of various IEEE standard test systems using the 
method proposed in the paper and other methods used by 
earlier researchers show clearly that the proposed method is 
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more realistic and draws a margin between stable and unstable 
region. Although, the proposed approach is simple, it provides 
a new direction for complex system network research.  
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